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ACCESS TO AND CHOICE OF CREDIT CONTRACTS IN THE PHILIPPINES 
Abstract 
The paper examines the determinants of access to and choice of contracts that results 
in the matching of heterogenous informal lenders with borrowers in the Philippines. The 
regression results suggest a predictable pattern of matching farmer and trader lenders with 
borrowers based on occupational specialization of lenders and borrower characteristics. 
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by 
Geetha Nagarajan and Richard L. Meyer 
The informal credit market has become the primary source of rural credit in the 
Philippines in the 1980s, and traders and farmers are the major sources of funds (Bautista 
and Magno). While the formal credit markets were active during the seventies, there was 
a severe contraction in formal loans due to the insolvency of many rural banks in the 
eighties (Blanco and Meyer). Consequently, the informal market has reemerged as an 
important source of rural credit. Although several studies describe informal credit markets 
in the Philippines (Adams and Sandoval; Agabin et al.; Larson), there is little empirical 
analysis that explains credit contracts or the behavior of the participants. 
Esguerra and Meyer, Floro, and Geron documented the presence in the Philippines 
of different types of informal lenders offering heterogenous credit contracts in rural areas, 
usually involving interlinkages of credit with labor, land and product markets. They argued 
that lender specialization and sorting affect borrower access to credit, and empirically 
validated the proposition using data on observed credit contracts. Empirical studies often 
use data on observed borrower credit contracts to examine borrower access to or choice of 
credit contracts. These studies ignore the fact that the observed contracts result from the 
matching of interests between borrowers and lenders, and this matching is determined by 
a two step process involving borrower access to and choice of credit contracts. While the 
assumption of symmetry between the determinants of access to and choice of contracts is 
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valid for a single lender offering homogenous contracts, the assumption is incorrect for a 
credit market characterized by different types of lenders offering heterogenous contracts. 
When the participants and loans are not homogenous, it is incorrect to equate the determi-
nants of access to credit contracts with contract choice. Therefore, the determinants of 
borrower access to contracts or contract choice cannot be directly estimated from data on 
observed credit contracts. 
This paper examines the borrower and lender characteristics that determine access 
to and contract choice in informal credit markets in rural Philippines. The data available 
through typical surveys of informal credit markets allow for only the empirical estimation 
of the determinants of the matching of lenders with borrowers, rather than the direct 
estimation of access to or contract choice. The informal credit market is co~prised of 
heterogenous lenders including traders, farmers, money lenders, input dealers, rice millers, 
retail store owners, and friends and relatives 1• We concentrate on rice trader and farmer 
lenders who are the primary sources of credit in rice growing villages. The empirical 
analysis is based on cross section data obtained from an intensive survey conducted by the 
International Rice Research Institute during the period 1985-86 and 1989 2• The sample 
includes 127 randomly selected farm households in two villages located in the major rice 
growing province of Nueva Ecija in Central Luzon. 
The next section describes the study villages, and is followed by a section discussing 
the matching of borrowers with lenders in informal credit markets. Section four presents the 
econometric analysis used to explain the determinants that match lenders with borrowers, 
and section five concludes the paper. 
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Description of Study Villa~es and Sample Households 
Table 1 presents a profile of the sample households. While the sample village Vl 
is fully irrigated by gravity irrigation systems and grows two rice crops a year, V2 is charac-
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terized by favorable rainfed conditions with only a few farms practicing double cropping. 
Therefore, average rice yields and farm income are significantly higher in Vl than in V2. 
The majority of farms are small and 83 percent of the land is under land reform beneficiary 
status 3• Before land reform, the farms were large rice haciendas and the majority of 
farmers were share tenants. 
Of the 127 households interviewed, 112 reported borrowing from 132 different trader 
and farmer lenders 4 (Table 2). The majority of the 502 credit contracts reported by the 
households were tied with product, labor and land markets. In general, the product linked 
loans required the borrowers to repay with farm products (usually rice), and the labor linked 
contracts required the borrowers to provide the lender with permanent or temporary labor 
services. The stipulation 'tampa' in the product linked contracts with trader lenders 
additionally required the borrowers to sell their entire marketable surplus to the lender 5• 
The contracts linked with land involved the pawning of cultivation rights through which the 
borrower transfers the cultivation rights to the pawnee for a loan and redeems the rights 
upon loan repayment (Nagarajan, David and Meyer). The frequency of linking credit with 
farm products was higher with traders than farmer lenders. Although the majority of loans 
from farmers were linked with farm products, land and labor links were also used to secure 
these loans. There were many farmer lender loans, however, with no factor market links, 
but with an implicit promise of reciprocity. This phenomena is explained by the large 
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percentage of farmer lender contracts with friends, relatives and neighbors, while the 
majority of trader loans were with business partners and borrowers with no familial ties. 
In the absence of a formalized contract, long term familial and business relations guarantee 
a well establish~d informational base for the lenders. The frequency of loans obtained for 
production purposes was higher with traders than with farmer lenders. 
The above observations demonstrate the presence of several trader and farmer 
lenders offering nonhomogeneous contracts in these villages. The determinants that match 
lenders with borrowers include differences in the information base of the lenders, and 
different purposes for borrowing. 
The Matching of Borrowers and Lenders in Informal Credit Markets 
The matching of borrowers and lenders can be explained by a two stage process 
involving a) borrower access to, and b) choice of credit contract. In the first stage, lender 
specialization by primary economic activity creates differences in accessibility to credit 
contracts by borrowers. In the second stage, given a borrower's accessibility to 
contracts/lenders, a borrower chooses a contract from his/her potential set of lenders based 
upon his/her characteristics and the attributes of the contract. 
The occupational specialization of profit maximizing lenders leads to differential 
access by borrowers to credit contracts, i.e., the potential set of contracts available is 
determined by a borrower's ability to facilitate the lender's primary economic activity. 
Therefore, contracts from farmer lenders are available to labor abundant households due 
to the farmers need to secure labor services during peak seasons, while trader lender 
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contracts are available to farmers with a large marketable rice surplus. Furthermore, 
accessibility to trader and farmer lenders also depends on the informational base used by 
lenders to screen borrowers. It can be postulated that access to trader contracts is restricted 
to those borrowers with a large capacity to produce farm output, while farmer lender 
contracts are accessible to labor abundant households and to borrowers able to pawn land. 
Farm size is positively associated with contracts from either source, but land tenure status 
is more important to farmer lenders than to traders because cultivation rights may be 
permanently transferred in the event of default 6• 
Given the set of contracts available to him/her, the utility maximizing borrower 
chooses from the set based on the specific services offered by the contract. Although it is 
not uncommon for a borrower to have only one or no choice, most have multiple choices 
due to the presence of several lenders in each village. While the stipulation 'tampa' by 
trader lenders allows little flexibility to divert loans to consumption purposes, farmer lender 
loans can be used for consumption provided the borrowers tie loans to land or labor 
services. Whereas loans are often fungible, close monitoring by lenders and peers and 
penalties for default reduce fungibility in informal credit markets. Furthermore, proximity 
and close social relations also minimize asymmetric information and fungibility. Ceteris 
paribus, the choice of contract from among the potential set depends upon the lender's 
flexibility to provide borrower specific services. We can hypothesize that a borrower chooses 
a trader lender contract when the loan is for production purposes and the borrower is fully 
engaged in farming. Farmer lender contracts will be chosen when the borrower intends to 
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use the loan for consumption and the borrower has an ability to engage in nonfarming 
activities apart from farming that can generate income for repaying loans. 
Access to credit contracts is contingent upon the borrower's ability to facilitate the 
lender's primary economic activity, while contract choice by borrowers is contingent, first, 
on access to the contract and, second, the attributes of the contracts. When there are 
differentiated contracts offered by multiple lenders, it is difficult to separately estimate the 
determinants of access from the determinants of contract choice. In typical farm surveys, 
we observe the ex-post realization of the two stage process that results in the matching of 
specific lenders with specific borrowers. Thus, we are limited to estimating the determinants 
of the function that matches lenders with borrowers in a given institutional setting. 
Econometric Analysis 
A single equation logit model was estimated for each lender type using the maximum 
likelihood method to examine the factors affecting the matching of informal lenders with 
borrowers. The dependent variable is dichotomous, taking a value of 1 if the borrower 
received a loan from farmer (trader) lenders during 1988-89, and 0 otherwise. 
The independent variables include the household's income earning capacity as 
measured by farm size in hectares (FSIZE), and annual gross returns per hectare from rice 
farming (RETURNS), human capital denoted by years of schooling (EDUHH), experience 
in farming (AGEHH), market value of nonland assets (ASSETS), share of nonfarm income 
in total household income (NONSHARE), and ratio of eligible laborers to total family 
members (LABRATIO). The tenurial status of land owned is captured by the percent of 
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land area under beneficiary status (CLTLH) and under nonbeneficiary status (OC). The 
number of years in the village by the household head (STAY) and a dummy variable that 
captures the business customer relationship with the lender (DCUST) are proxies for the 
information of the lenders. The productive purpose of the loan is represented as a dummy 
variable (DP). The variables DCUST and DP refer to 1988-89, while all other variables 
.....,, refer to the year 1985 to avoid endogeneity problems 7• 
The regression results are presented in Table 3. The significant positive results for 
FSIZE, RETURNS, ASSET and LABRA TIO, and the negative coefficient for NONSHARE 
indicate that borrowers with a large capacity to fully engage in rice farming are matched 
with trader lenders. As expected, the probability of matching borrowers with trader lenders 
is positive and significant for those who borrow for rice production purposes with previous 
business relationships, while it is the opposite with farmer lenders. Furthermore, the 
variable ST A Y is negative and significant for trader lenders but positive and significant for 
farmer lenders. Borrowers with familial relationships who borrow for consumption purposes 
are matched with farmer lenders, while those with business relations borrow from trader 
lenders. The variables EDUHH, AGEHH, ASSET, NONSHARE, and LABRATIO have 
the expected signs in column 4 and support the hypotheses that households capable of 
performing nonfarm activities and endowed with abundant labor are matched with farmer 
lenders. A significant positive coefficient for RETURNS and negative coefficient for FSIZE 
indicates that households with smaller marketable rice surplus are matched with farmer 
lenders through product links. The coefficient for CLTLH is negative and significant in the 
farmer lender equation suggesting riskiness of lending, but in fact there is little risk of 
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lending to beneficiaries for there are few incentives for reporting illegal pawning transac-
tions in the sample villages 8• 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The informal credit market has reemerged as a primary source of rural credit in the 
Philippines. Rice traders and farmer lenders are the major types of informal lenders in rice 
growing villages, and they employ factor and product market ties and social relations to 
secure their loans with borrower households. We posited that the occupational specialization 
of these informal lenders and specific borrower characteristics result in the observed 
matching of lenders with borrowers, and tested these propositions using primary data 
collected from rice growing villages. The regression results suggest a predictable pattern of 
matching heterogenous lenders with borrowers. Trader lenders tend to be matched with 
borrowers having a large capacity to produce rice and who borrow for rice production 
purposes. Farmer lenders are matched with borrowers who borrow for consumption 
purposes using land, labor and product links, and who are engaged in nonfarming activities. 
The observed pattern in the matching of lenders with borrowers suggests specializa-
tion in rural informal credit markets based on lender's occupation and information base. 
This specialization, however, limits the effective functioning of a particular type of lender 
outside his/her specialized field due to the lack of incentives and borrower screening 
technologies. Therefore, the presence of several heterogenous lenders offering nonhomoge-
neous credit contracts in a village is not evidence of a competitive market. Introducing a 
formal credit institution into this market will not likely improve the distribution of credit to 
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small farmers if formal lenders cannot effectively compete with specialized lenders to 
provide borrower - specific services. Since it is not possible for formal credit institutions to 
specialize in trading, farming, etc., in order to compete with informal lenders, they must 
develop mechanisms that reduce asymmetric information and enhance their borrower 
screening technology. 
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End Notes 
1. The occupational specialization of different types of informal lenders lead to differences 
in their objective functions and heterogeneity among the lenders. 
2. Primary data on farm production, household income and demographic characteristics of 
the sample households were collected in 1985-86 and in 1988-89. An intensive survey on the 
credit market transactions of the sample households was conducted by the senior author in 
1989. 
3. The land under beneficiary status refers to land under Certificate of Land Transfer 
(CLT) and Leasehold (LH) tenurial status. Under the land reform of rice and corn lands 
in 1972, share tenants were supposed to be converted to Leaseholders (LH) by Operation 
Leasehold when the landlord owned less than 7 ha. of land, or to Certificate of Land 
Transfer (CLT) holders under Operation Land Transfer when the landlord owned more 
than 7 ha. of land (Hayami, Quisumbing and Adriano). 
4. There were a total of 180 different lenders under 7 different lender types offering 688 
credit contracts during the reference period. However, this analysis is restricted to the 2 
main lender types of trader and farmer lenders. 
5. While the condition of 'tampa' is not explicitly stated in the majority of the product 
linked contracts from trader lenders, it is implicitly assumed. 
6. The Land reform restricts the transfer of ownership title of the reform beneficiaries to 
only their legal heirs. Hence, land pawning contracts by land reform beneficiaries are 
considered illegal. While the temporary transfer of land cultivation rights by the beneficia-
ries can be disguised as a simple credit contract, it is not the case with a permanent transfer 
of cultivation rights which is similar to sale of land rights. If these illegal transactions are 
detected, the pawned land is supposed to be confiscated by the land reform agency. This risk 
of eviction may restrict the lenders to pawn land from borrowers with secured land owner-
ship rights or from borrowers with a large capacity to repay loans (See Nagarajan, David 
and Meyer for further details). 
7. The variable DCUST is 1 if the borrower had a business customer relationship with the 
lender sometime during the previous 4 years and 0 otherwise. The variable DP is 1 if the 
loan is taken for farm production purposes and 0 otherwise. 
8. Otsuka argued that in practice there exists a very low risk of eviction in the study villages 
due to the lack of incentives for reporting the illegal pawning transactions in Operation 
Land Transfer areas. Furthermore, there were only a few pawning transactions and hence 
the negative and significant result does not reveal a significant risk for the beneficiary lands. 
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Table 1 : Socio-Economic Characteristics of the Sample Households 
Items Vl V2 Total 
Sample 
Sample Farm Households 80 47 127 
Percent Area Irrigated 100 21 72 
Rice Cropping Intensity 209 120 179 
Average Farm Size (Ha.) 2.2 1.9 2.1 
Percent Area Under Beneficiary Status 1 84.0 82.0 83.0 
Percent Area Under Non Beneficiary 
Status 2 
14.0 18.0 15.0 
Percent Area Under Share Tenancy 2.0 1.0 2.0 
Average Rice Yield ('000 Ton/ha) 4.6 3.9 4.1 
Average Farm income ('000 P) 17.9 4.4 10.1 
Average Nonfarm Income ('000 P) 9.2 11.1 10.2 
Value of Nonland Assets Owned ('000 P) 48.8 28.8 41.9 
Average Age of the Household Head (Yrs.) 49.8 45.5 48.1 
Average Schooling of the Household Head 6.4 6.3 6.4 
(Yrs.) 
Total No. of Household Members 6.0 5.0 5.0 
Number of Years of Stay in the Village 24.2 21.4 22.6 
by the HH head 
1 Refers to land with Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) and Leasehold (LH) tenurial 
status. 
2 Refers to land with Owner Cultivator (OC) tenurial status. 
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Table 2 : Credit Contracts of the Sample Households, by Trader and Farmer Lender Type. 
Item Traders Farmers Total 
No. Borrower Households 112 110 1121 
No. Different Lenders 30 102 132 
No. of Credit Contracts 249 253 502 
% With Product Link 81 49 65 
% With Labor Link 1 6 3 
% With Land Link 2 8 6 
% Land+ Labor+ Product Links 0 1 1 
% No Links 16 36 26 
Relationship Between Participants (Percent of Contracts) 
Friends and Relatives 16 79 47 
Business Partners 28 2 15 
Neighbors 2 14 8 
None 54 6 30 
% Contracts for Farm Production 65 41 52 
Mean Loan Size 2 6003 5192 
(9332) (3412) 
Mean Seasonal Interest rate 25.6 22.6 
(Season = 5 months) {12.9) {16.3) 
1 Since some households borrow from both farmer and trader lenders, the total does not 
add up to 222. 
2 Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
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Table 3: Single Equation Logit Estimates for the Determinants of the 
Matching of Borrowers and Lenders 
Particulars 
CONSTANT 
FSIZE 
RETURNS 
EDUHH 
AGEHH 
ASSET 
NONSHARE 
LABRATIO 
CLTLH 
oc 
STAY 
DC UST 
DP 
Chi-Square 
Log Likelihood 
Trader Lender 
Coe ff. 
-0.931 
0.168 
0.204 
-0.126 
-0.136 
0.146 
-0.291 
0.989 
0.937 
-0.367 
-0.118 
1.853 
0.818 
140.59 
-375.16 
T-Ratio 
-1.709* 
1.785* 
2.405* 
-1.032 
-1.558 
5.010** 
-0.579 
1.396* 
0.405 
-0.924 
-2.032* 
6.394** 
4.422** 
* *, * represent significance at 1 % and 10%, respectively. 
Farmer Lender 
Coe ff. 
1.833 
-0.171 
0.141 
0.671 
-0.209 
-0.871 
0.583 
0.459 
-1.371 
-0.866 
0.128 
-2.119 
-0.809 
152.56 
-372.49 
T-Ratio 
2.867** 
-1.730* 
1.717* 
1.887* 
-2.231 * 
-2.568** 
1.712* 
1.102 
-1.975* 
-1.035 
1.938* 
-4.338** 
-4.492** 
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